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Analysing the history of  Nazism in his 1939 article, “The Jews and Europe,” the
philosopher Max Horkheimer declared: “whoever is not willing to talk about
capitalism should also keep quiet about fascism.” Conceiving “Nazism” as a spe-
cific variety of  “fascism,” he thus tied up the histories of  Nazism and
capitalism.1
Horkheimer was a premier intellectual of  the Frankfurt School of
social theory – a leading current of  Marxist thought in the West in the twentieth
century.2 Given his Marxism, his association of  Nazism with capitalism was not
surprising. As a Marxist, moreover, Horkheimer thought that understanding
Nazism did not demand the formulation of  new theoretical concepts. He
believed that Marxism was sufficient for explaining it.3
Horkheimer’s views on understanding Nazism clashed with those of  its
best-known theorist – Hannah Arendt. In her magnum opus, the 1951 The Origins
of  Totalitarianism, Arendt argued that the twentieth century saw the rise of  a his-
torically new form of  political organisation. This “novel form of  government”
was what she famously termed “totalitarianism.”4 She claimed that it appeared in
two forms – the regimes of  Joseph Stalin in the Soviet Union and Adolf  Hitler
in Germany. Arendt thus proposed that totalitarianism was an unprecedented
historical phenomenon. And, unlike Horkheimer, she thought that it defied all
accepted categories of  historical and social-scientific explanation. For her, under-
standing it required new theoretical concepts and methods of  historical and
social-scientific analysis.5
In Arendt’s view, Marxism could not explain totalitarianism. In Origins,
she argued that Nazism and Stalinism were ideological regimes. Each was based
on an ideology – racism and Marxism, respectively – in which it believed fanati-
cally, and in whose name it perpetrated mass murder.6 Thus, Arendt implicated
Marxism in the history of  totalitarianism. For her, employing it to understand
totalitarianism would, hence, be absurd. It would be attempting to make totalitar-
ianism understand itself.
Contra her indictment of  Marxism, this essay elucidates a strange con-
vergence of  Arendt’s and Horkheimer’s thinking on Nazism. It transpires – sur-
prisingly – in a book of  Arendt that, on its surface, is utterly unrelated to
Marxism. The book is the famous – and notorious – Eichmann in Jerusalem: A
Report on the Banality of  Evil.
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Published in 1963, last year Eichmann turned fifty. It is Arendt’s most
controversial work. Written as a “report” on the trial of  Adolf  Eichmann, the
Nazi bureaucrat chiefly responsible for organising the deportations of  the Jews
of  Europe to the Nazi concentration camps during the Final Solution, it argued
that the accused was not a monster driven by genocidal motives, but very much a
“normal” person, one, in fact, all too similar to many other Germans under
Hitler’s regime. His most striking trait, moreover, was something different from
inhuman cruelty: it was a peculiar “inability to think” from the perspective of
another human being.7
Eichmann’s publication sparked intense controversies, some of  which
continue even today.8 Scholars have, thus, questioned Arendt’s idiosyncratic styli-
sation of  the Nazi bureaucrat. They have critiqued and endeavoured to rethink
what, as we shall see, constituted Eichmann’s main argument – Arendt’s concep-
tion of  “the banality of  evil.”9 Critics of  Arendt have, also, argued that she seri-
ously misunderstood Eichmann and his crimes. They have claimed that, as a
main perpetrator of  the Holocaust, Eichmann was a monstrous mass murderer,
motivated by a genocidal anti-Semitism.10
Scrutinising Eichmann, this essay also proposes that Arendt misunder-
stood Eichmann. But I depart from the claim of  previous critiques that she
missed the monster’s monstrosity. I argue that, unexpectedly, the book subverts
its own central argument by formulating an analysis that Arendt never meant to
make. Surprisingly, the work articulates an unintended subtext. This narrative
shows that Eichmann’s defining characteristic was not what Arendt saw as his
defective thinking. It was, strikingly, his being bourgeois. Moreover, the book’s
strange subtext suggests that what turned Eichmann into a chief  perpetrator of
the Holocaust was neither wickedness, nor a flawed mind. It was, astonishingly,
precisely his being bourgeois. Eichmann, thus, exhibits a hitherto unrecognised
Marxist dimension – a Marxist subtextual narrative that, implicitly and unbe-
knownst to the author, represents Eichmann as bourgeois, and implicates that
mode of  being in his crimes. This subtext thereby transforms the book into an
inadvertent critique of  capitalism. 
This essay is an analytical experiment. It focuses on Eichmann, and
develops a close and critical reading of  the work. It does not claim, in general,
that Eichmann’s being bourgeois was what transformed him into a chief  perpe-
trator of  the Holocaust. Rather, I argue that, unwittingly and subtextually,
Arendt’s book portrays Eichmann as being bourgeois and implicates his being bour-
geois in his genocidal crimes. In this sense, Eichmann constitutes an inadvertent
and implicit Marxist critique of  capitalism.11 The essay proposes that Arendt’s
book can be interpreted as such a critique and explores how it can be read so.
Thus, it is an experimental exercise of  rethinking Eichmann. 
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As such, the essay critiques Arendt. But, in doing so, it embraces faith-
fully the spirit of  her thinking. In an essay on Martin Heidegger that celebrated
thinking, Arendt declared: “Every thinker, if  only he grows old enough, must
strive to unravel what have actually emerged as the results of  his thought, and he
does this simply by rethinking them.”12 These words constitute a clarion affirma-
tion of  critical self-reflection – of  critical rethinking of  one’s thinking. This essay
tries to rethink Arendt’s thinking on Eichmann.
Eichmann’s Ostensible Main Argument
Eichmann’s ostensible main argument was thoroughly non-Marxist. It was journal-
istic and “factual.”13 In her correspondence, Arendt described the book as fol-
lows: “there are no ‘ideas’ in this Report, there are only facts with a few conclu-
sions, and these conclusions usually appear at the end of  each chapter. The only
exception to this is the Epilog, which is a discussion of  the legal aspect of  the
case [italics mine].”14 In Eichmann’s “Postscript,” Arendt similarly said: “this book
contains a trial report” [italics in original.] Arendt thus took seriously the word
“report” in the subtitle of  her work. She was convinced that the book was,
indeed, a “report” on Eichmann’s trial. The central object of  its reportage was,
hence, the trial’s accused. Focusing on and scrutinising him, Arendt reported that
his defining characteristic was his incapacity to think from the perspective of
another individual.15
But while seeking factuality, Arendt’s report turned idiosyncratic. It
veered away from a rigorous reportage on Eichmann’s trial, and towards the
Nazi’s mental peculiarities. In fact, the relationship between the workings of
Eichmann’s mind and his involvement in the Holocaust became one of  its key
themes. Eichmann’s main, apparent argument centres on what Arendt termed
“the banality of  evil.” Appearing in its subtitle, this phrase assumes an enormous
significance in the book. Eichmann is, indeed, a report not on the Eichmann trial,
but on “the banality of  evil.” The meaning of  the phrase constitutes its central,
ostensible argument.
“The banality of  evil,” as Arendt explained, did not designate a philo-
sophical concept, but a “factual … phenomenon which stared one in the face at
[Eichmann’s] trial.” The “factual phenomenon” consisted of  the blatant fact that
the Nazi bureaucrat was not an “abnormal monster” driven by excessively evil
motives, but very much a “normal” person. “Eichmann was not Iago and not
Macbeth,” wrote Arendt, “and nothing would have been farther from his mind
than to determine with Richard III ‘to prove a villain.’” The “factual phenome-
non” included, also, the fact that Eichmann’s defining characteristic was, as we
noted, what Arendt called his “sheer thoughtlessness,” his “almost total” “inabili-
ty to think, namely, to think from the standpoint of  somebody else.” This mental
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debility, Arendt proposed, “predisposed him to become one of  the greatest
criminals of  [the Nazi] period.” It prevented him from grasping the implications
of  his actions and from realising “that he [was] doing wrong.” In this way,
Eichmann’s monoperspectival thinking contributed to his becoming a perpetra-
tor of  genocide. All of  these ideas on Eichmann, his trial, and his involvement
in the Holocaust constitute Arendt’s understanding of  “the banality of  evil.”16
And, they form the main, ostensible argument of  her book.17
The Cunning Subtext
Eichmann thus interpreted Eichmann’s crimes as a function of  a defective mind.
But while connecting his thinking to genocide, Arendt’s analysis of  the Nazi sub-
tly slips away from her. Cunningly, it takes a life of  its own, and, behind her
back, articulates its own interpretation of  Eichmann. This inadvertent subtext
diverges radically from the main, ostensible argument of  Arendt’s book. It
weaves itself  as a subliminal narrative that comes to compete with that argu-
ment.18
Focused as it is on him, Eichmann contains a biography of  Eichmann. It
is spread throughout the book, and examines his life, crimes, and trial. Eichmann’s
cunning subtext emerges palpably in this biography. On it, Eichmann’s activities
during the Nazi era were motivated to a great extent by a powerful drive to suc-
ceed. This momentous drive assumed three forms: a faith in success as the ulti-
mate ideal of  life, an ardent ambition, and a vigorous careerism. In its three vari-
eties, his forceful drive to success dominated and defined Eichmann’s Nazi life.
As Eichmann’s biography portrayed it, Eichmann’s socio-economic back-
ground was respectable. His own social status, though, was mediocre. “In court,”
reported Arendt, “Eichmann gave the impression of  a typical member of  the
lower middle classes … . But this was misleading; he was rather the déclassé son
of  a solid middle-class family.” Eichmann’s father had been a stereotypical bour-
geois: he had worked successively as an accountant, a company official, and an
entrepreneur. His son, in contrast, was socially inferior to him. Intellectually,
Eichmann was a mediocrity; professionally, he was a disappointment. At school,
he was a bad student and never completed his secondary education. Without
much schooling, he afterwards tried his hand at work. He held a few humble
occupations, first as a labourer and then, in succession, in two positions as a
salesman for two Austrian companies. In 1933, he lost the last of  these jobs. By
that time, he had, in terms of  career and socio-economic status, become “a fail-
ure.” The previous year, however, he had enrolled in the Nazi party and the SS.
After his last layoff  in 1933, he embarked on his “career” in the Third Reich.19
But while dropping out of  the middle class, Eichmann remained bour-
geois in his socio-economic ideals. As a bureaucrat of  the Holocaust, he routine-
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ly met and negotiated with representatives of  Jewish communities and interests.
In these dealings, he did not always comport himself  as a ruthless Nazi; fre-
quently, he showed civility. These good manners had a peculiar root. “The polite-
ness he often showed to [such] functionaries,” explained Arendt, “was to a large
extent the result of  his recognition that he was dealing with people who were
socially his superiors.” Thus, disregarding the dicta of  Nazi ideology that denied
Jews humanity, Eichmann treated courteously Jewish leaders that he dealt with
because of  their social eminence. More generally, respectable, bourgeois society
occupied a special place in his heart and mind. He placed it on a pedestal of
esteem. It inspired in him an intense and deep admiration. At all times, he was
“overawed by ‘good society.’”20
Its bewitchment of  Eichmann linked bourgeois society to the genocide
that he organised. Arendt, however, proposed that that society’s complicity in the
Holocaust surpassed its hypnotism on the bureaucrat. She argued that it was
implicated strongly in the crimes of  Nazism. “The whole of  [German]
respectable society,” she declared, “… in one way or another succumbed to
Hitler.” Indeed, the entire European bourgeoisie also surrendered to Nazism.
The regime “caused” a “total[…] … moral collapse” “in respectable European
society – not only in Germany but in almost all countries.” Analysing the work-
ings of  Eichmann’s conscience during the Nazi era, Arendt wrote: 
His conscience was … set at rest when he saw the zeal and
eagerness with which “good society” everywhere reacted as he
did [i.e., it accepted and supported Hitler’s regime]. He did not
need to “close his ears to the voice of  conscience,” as the
judgment [of  his trial] has it, not because he had none, but
because his conscience spoke with … the voice of  respectable
society around him.21
Aristotle believed that a society’s middle class is the custodian of  morality and
prudence in its politics.22 In Eichmann, Arendt claimed that German – and
European – “respectable society” during the Nazi regime made a mockery of
Aristotle’s classic praise of  the middle class. She contended that the German and
European bourgeoisie largely embraced Hitler’s rule. It thus demoralised itself
deeply: it adopted Nazism’s political ideas and moral values, which included anti-
Semitism and murder. More concretely, the society of  that bourgeoisie corrupted
Eichmann morally. By pacifying his conscience, it encouraged his perpetration of
genocide.23
Analysing the history of  totalitarianism in The Origins of  Totalitarianism,
Arendt made a tremendously important statement on the bourgeoisie of  modern
Europe. Its “way and philosophy of  life,” she observed, was “insistently and
exclusively centered on the individual’s success or failure in ruthless competi-
tion.”24 This historical dictum is momentous. It shows that, in her understanding
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of  modern European history, Arendt conceived “success” as the supreme ideal
of  Europe’s bourgeoisie and bourgeois society. 
In Eichmann, Arendt proposed that Eichmann too embraced “success”
as his own highest ideal. “What he fervently believed in up to the end,” she
wrote, “was success, the chief  standard of  ‘good society’ as he knew it.”25 In this
way, Arendt represented Eichmann as a passionate adherent to the supreme stan-
dard of  individual excellence and worth of  Europe’s bourgeoisie. She depicted
him as being intensely bourgeois in heart and mind.
The bourgeois focus on success was a vital source of  what was the cen-
tral allegiance in Eichmann’s life – his loyalty to his Führer. The Adolf  in the
dock in Jerusalem cherished for the Adolf  at the helm of  the Nazi Reich a
“‘boundless and immoderate admiration.’” And that veneration had a special
mainspring. Eichmann himself  expressed his awe as follows at his trial: 
Hitler … “may have been wrong all down the line, but one
thing is beyond dispute: the man was able to work his way up
from lance corporal in the German Army to Führer of  a peo-
ple of  almost eighty million. … His success alone proved to
me that I should subordinate myself  to this man.”
In Eichmann, Hitler inspired reverence as a self-made man, as an embodiment
of  individual achievement. Eichmann worshipped his Führer because, to him,
Hitler was an incarnation of  success – the supreme ideal of  European bourgeois
society. And that society itself  “reacted [to Hitler] as [Eichmann] did.” A main
reason why it embraced Nazism, Arendt argued, was precisely Hitler’s “success”
– his rise from a lowly everyman to Germany’s master. German and European
respectable society was enthralled by this ascent. It too, like Eichmann, embraced
Hitler and subjected itself  to him.26
For Arendt, then, modern Europe’s bourgeoisie had one singular and
supreme ideal – individual success. A déclassé from it, Eichmann made its top-
most ideal his own highest creed. Its admiration of  success drew Europe’s bour-
geoisie towards Nazism. Admiring what it saw as Hitler’s triumphal ascent to the
summits of  political power, it lined up behind him and offered him a devoted
support. Enthralled by success, Eichmann likewise subjected himself  to the indi-
vidual whom he saw as the incarnation of  success. He enthralled himself  to
Hitler, transforming himself  into a devoted executor of  his Führer’s rule. This
crucial transformation of  Eichmann into a militant agent of  Nazism was moti-
vated by a force that was thoroughly “bourgeois” in character – faith in success
as the loftiest ideal in life.  
Converting him into a dedicated agent of  Nazism, Eichmann’s drive to
success also defined three key moments in his Nazi life. The first one appeared
before Hitler’s seizure of  power. In April 1932, Eichmann enlisted in the SS.
This was the organisation in which he eventually became the principal bureaucrat
of  genocide during Hitler’s regime. His enlistment was, thus, a momentous
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event: it constituted the beginning of  his “career” as a chief  perpetrator of  the
Holocaust. At his trial, the issue of  his motivation in joining the SS was brought
up, and he had to explain it. He purported that his decision had been an unre-
markable occurrence. A friend of  his “had said to him: Why not join the S.S.?
And he had replied, Why not? That was how it had happened, and that was
about all there was to it.” But Arendt was not taken in by this story. “What
Eichmann failed to tell the presiding judge in cross-examination,” she wrote,
was that he had been an ambitious young man who was fed up
with his job as … [a] salesman … . From a humdrum life
without significance and consequence the wind had blown
him into History, as he understood it, namely, into a
Movement [the Nazi movement] … in which somebody like
him – already a failure in the eyes of  his social class, of  his
family, and hence in his own eyes as well – could start from
scratch and still make a career [italics mine]. 
Not indifference and the casual prompting of  a friend, then, but ambition was the
reason for Eichmann’s entry into the SS. That organisation offered the prospect
of  an advantageous career; his ambition – his powerful drive to success – forced
him to seize it. The bourgeois drive to success was, thus, what compelled
Eichmann to join the SS. It was the motive for perhaps the most fateful choice
of  his life.27
The second occasion when his drive to success overwhelmed
Eichmann’s Nazi life came about six years later. Like his entry into the SS, this
too was a key moment in his Nazi “career.” The year was 1938, and Hitler’s
Reich had just annexed Austria. In March, Eichmann was sent to Vienna, where
he was put in charge of  the Centre for Emigration of  Austrian Jews. His assign-
ment was to organise the “expulsion” of  “all Jews” from Austria. Eichmann’s
Vienna mission “was his first important job, his whole career … was in the bal-
ance.” He did not disappoint his superiors. “His success,” wrote Arendt, “was
spectacular: … in less than eighteen months, Austria was ‘cleansed’ of  close to a
hundred and fifty thousand people, roughly sixty per cent of  its Jewish popula-
tion.” And what brought about the “stellar” completion of  Eichmann’s assign-
ment? It was his frenetic dedication to it. Aware of  its importance for his
“career,” Arendt argued, “he must have been frantic to make good.” Arendt did
not provide evidence to demonstrate Eichmann’s careerist zeal. But her hypothe-
sis is clear: what gave rise to Eichmann’s egregious “success” was his vigorous
careerism – his intense application to his assigned duties – to his job, to his
“career.”28
Eichmann’s “work” in Vienna “marked the real beginning of  his
career.” It established him as a leading “expert on ‘the Jewish question,’” and “as
an ‘authority’ on … [expulsion], as the ‘master’ who knew how to make people
move.” Armed with such a reputation, he quickly rose in the ranks of  the SS.
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When he went to Vienna in the spring of  1938, he had the rank of  a lieutenant;
in the autumn of  1941, he was promoted to lieutenant colonel. Shortly before
that promotion, he was appointed chief  of  Subsection IV-B-4 of  the Head
Office for Reich Security, one of  the main branches of  the SS. That subsection
was the SS department that organised the deportations of  the Jews of  Europe to
the Nazi concentration and death camps during the Final Solution. His rule of  it
was what made Eichmann one of  the main perpetrators of  the Holocaust. And
what, again, unleashed his hectic climb to the lieutenant-colonelcy and to the
headship of  IV-B-4 was his dedicated, careerist application to his duties in
Vienna.29
A similar dedication transpired towards the end of  Eichmann’s Nazi
“career.” The year was 1944, and the context was east of  the Austrian capital-in
Hungary. That country became the scene of  one of  the most tragic chapters in
the history of  the Holocaust. Assisted by a strong home-grown anti-Semitism,
and by the Hungarian authorities, the Nazis wrought an extreme genocide.
“Nowhere else,” Arendt explained, “were so many people deported and extermi-
nated in such a brief  span of  time.”30
Eichmann was the chief  executor of  the Holocaust in Hungary. But he
did not have sole command of  it. He was a part of  a crew that was charged with
its execution. And these agents of  genocide did not always work in harmony.
Eichmann was, in fact, exasperated by one of  them – a Kurt Becher, who was
sent over by Heinrich Himmler, the commander-in-chief  of  the Final Solution.
In Eichmann’s eyes, Becher was a pest. He had a task that seemed to interfere
with Eichmann’s own. And what was it? It was a “business” assignment: Becher
had to arrange the seizure of  all Jewish economic assets. In Becher’s eyes,
Eichmann was the nuisance. “The one thing that stood in his way,” wrote
Arendt, “was the narrow-mindedness of  … creatures like Eichmann, who took
their jobs seriously [italics mine].” In Hungary, Eichmann thus showed his charac-
teristic rigid dedication to his job. He was once again the keen executive of  mass
murder – the devoted careerist striving after professional “success.”31
In Hungary, Eichmann’s careerism appeared also in another way. Taking
place in 1944, the Hungarian Holocaust was strongly influenced by the progress
of  the Second World War. At that time, it was becoming clear that Germany was
losing the War. One of  those overcome by the prospect was Himmler. As disas-
ter loomed more and more likely, he also realised that, if  defeat did come about,
the Holocaust would be extremely damning to the Nazi leadership. Accordingly,
he restrained the Third Reich’s assault on European Jewry. Until now, ideology –
the Nazis’ annihilationist anti-Semitism – had dominated the implementation of
the Final Solution. But, in Hungary, other motives cropped up and even came to
compete with the ideology. Chief  among them were economic ones. The pres-
ence of  Becher in Budapest, who was in fact given great authority and
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encroached on Eichmann’s, was one indication of  this shift. Another one was
corruption. It was rife in Hungary, as Jewish leaders tried to bribe their Nazi exe-
cutioners in a desperate attempt to save from death as many people as possible.
A third motive came from Himmler himself. He now conceived a proposal to
barter one million Jewish people for ten thousand trucks from the Allies, to be
used in Germany’s war effort. He even started negotiations on the deal with
Jewish functionaries in Hungary. The previous, ideologically motivated attack on
European Jewry de-escalated. What now followed was a messier state of  affairs,
in which the Nazis started loosening their fanatical anti-Semitism, and replacing
it with utilitarian drives.32
Eichmann was disappointed by these changes. On a mundane level, he
hated the intrusions into his authority of  someone like Becher. More important-
ly, he was a dedicated bureaucrat of  genocide, who had devoted his entire pro-
fessional career as an SS officer to executing the anti-Semitic ideology of  Hitler’s
regime. The de-escalation of  the Holocaust thus disillusioned him. But despite
his misgivings, he joined in the new tide. In Hungary, he became involved in the
negotiations on Himmler’s proposal to spare Jews in exchange for trucks. For
him, this was a serious about-face. He had compromised his “uncompromising”
professional SS service in genocide, and was now engaging in mercantile transac-
tions. And what was the reason for his metamorphosis? “The way he,” wrote
Arendt,
explained his role in this matter, in Jerusalem, showed clearly
how he had once justified it to himself: as a military necessity
that would bring him the additional benefit of  an important
new role in the … business [of  expulsion of  Jews]. What he
probably never admitted to himself  was that the … [new,
messier state of  affairs] made it every day more likely that he
would soon be without a job … unless he succeeded in find-
ing some foothold … [in the changed situation].
On Arendt’s analysis, the new confusion in the Final Solution undermined
Eichmann’s position, made it precarious, and he faced the prospect of  becoming
dispensable. At this critical moment, his concern for his job took over. It com-
pelled him to depart from his duties as an administrator of  mass murder, and to
become involved in the dealings on Himmler’s barter initiative. It overwhelmed
him and transformed him, once again, into a single-minded careerist.33
Analysing the history of  Nazism in The Origins of  Totalitarianism, Arendt
argued that most of  the regime’s loyal supporters were what she called “mass
men” – atomised individuals made desperate by the economic and political cata-
clysms in Europe during the late nineteenth and first half  of  the twentieth cen-
tury. Tapping their desperation, Nazism recruited and made these people 
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devoted followers. Some of  them were transformed into fanatical henchmen and
used for the perpetration of  crimes.34
In this analysis of  Nazi popular support, Arendt made a very significant
assessment of  the mindset of  the Nazi faithful. These individuals, she argued
momentously, cherished a “single-minded devotion to matters of  family and
career [italics mine].” “The mass man,” she wrote, 
whom Himmler organized for the greatest mass crimes ever
committed in history … was the bourgeois who in the midst of
the ruins of  his world worried about nothing so much as his
private security, was ready to sacrifice everything – belief,
honor, dignity – on the slightest provocation. Nothing proved
easier to destroy than the … private morality of  people who
thought of  nothing but safeguarding their private lives [italics
mine].35
In Arendt’s understanding of  Nazism, the dedicated, murderous Nazi follower
was a desperate bourgeois intensely focused on his “career.”36 In its analysis of
his activities in Hungary, Eichmann also represented Eichmann in this way.
Arendt described him as obsessed with his murderous job. She portrayed him as
a genocidal bourgeois careerist.
After his careerism pushed him into sinister “business” deals,
Eichmann rededicated himself  single-mindedly to the deportation of  the Jews of
Hungary to the concentration camps. But his return to his old ways set him
against Himmler. Starting in the spring of  1944, the latter, as we saw, slowed the
Holocaust down. Going against the directives of  Hitler, he tried from now on to
hold back the genocide of  Europe’s Jews – in an effort to put himself  in a good
position vis-à-vis the Allies, after Germany’s likely military defeat. In the course
of  this restraint, Eichmann grew opposed to him. Thus, in the autumn of  1944,
Himmler officially halted the deportation of  Hungary’s Jews. But, “when [his]
order to stop the evacuation of  Hungarian Jews arrived in Budapest, Eichmann
threatened … ‘to seek a new decision from the Führer.’”37
According to Arendt, the main reason for Eichmann’s opposition to
Himmler’s new policy was his awareness that it ran against the directives of
Hitler – which ordered the total annihilation of  European Jewry. And that oppo-
sition showed a peculiar psycho-intellectual dynamic. It was motivated by what,
above all, bound Eichmann to his Führer: his bourgeois admiration for Hitler,
the self-made success. A “personal element,” argued Arendt, was “undoubtedly
involved” in Eichmann’s dedication, contra Himmler, to the continuation of
genocide. That force “was his genuine, ‘boundless and immoderate admiration
for Hitler’ … – for the man who had made it ‘from lance corporal to Chancellor
of  the Reich.’” On Arendt’s own analysis, his reverence for Hitler, the incarna-
tion of  success, was, thus, a strong stimulus for Eichmann’s fanatical commit-
ment to the Holocaust in Hungary.38
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Arendt’s biography of  Eichmann, thus, bourgeoisified him. On it, he
was a dropout from the bourgeoisie, who, throughout his life, revered that class
and its “respectable” society. He was enthralled by the bourgeoisie’s most sub-
lime ideal – success. His thraldom to it compelled him to prostrate himself
before Hitler, who was to him its incarnation, and to become his zealous follow-
er. In the forms of  an ardent ambition and a single-minded careerism,
Eichmann’s drive to success became a dominant motive of  his Nazi life.
Ambition motivated his life-changing enlistment in the SS. Careerism produced
his ruthless deeds in Vienna, which launched his Nazi “career,” propelling him
on a rapid rise in the ranks of  the SS. That same careerism also guided
Eichmann’s activities in Hungary. There, it compelled him to apply himself  dedi-
catedly to his genocidal duties, and to take part in macabre mercantile deals, in
order to save his job. In Hungary, his servitude to success, in the form of  his
loyalty to Hitler-cum-success, also forced him to continue the Final Solution. In
all these ways, Eichmann represented Eichmann as being bourgeois.  
On that representation, moreover, his being bourgeois implicated
Eichmann in the crimes of  Nazism. It drove him towards perpetrating genocide.
His worship of  the bourgeois ideal of  success converted Eichmann into a fanati-
cal follower of  him whom he saw as the ideal’s incarnation – Hitler. In the form
of  ambition, his bourgeois drive to success induced Eichmann to enlist in the
SS. As careerism, it fueled his brutal “exploits” in Vienna. In Hungary, that
careerism dedicated him single-mindedly to the completion of  his assigned
duties – the deportation of  the country’s Jews to the Nazi concentration camps.
Also there, his bourgeois devotion to Hitler, the self-made success, compelled
him to oppose Himmler and to persist in implementing the Final Solution. All
these ways of  being bourgeois thus turned Eichmann into an executor of  mass
murder. They transformed him into one of  the chief  perpetrators of  the
Holocaust. 
The portrayal of  Eichmann as being bourgeois appears not only in
Arendt’s biography of  him, but also in her book’s very focus – its analysis of  his
mind. Eichmann’s main ostensible argument, as we saw, was that that mind
showed a fateful aberration – a monoperspectivism – that transformed
Eichmann into a chief  perpetrator of  the Holocaust. But Arendt’s representation
of  the Nazi bureaucrat showed that this disorder was not his only mental defect.
Also aberrant was his memory. Arendt thought that it worked in weird ways. It
was deeply “faulty” – punctured by severe lapses and gaps of  oblivion. It also
“jump[ed] with great ease over the years” and “was … not controlled by chrono-
logical order.” “It was like a storehouse,” Arendt asserted, “filled with human-
interest stories of  the worst type.”39
In Jerusalem, his mnemonic defects incriminated Eichmann. Thus, dur-
ing his trial, he averred that, in the 1930s, the ideas on “the Jewish question” of
the Nazis and of  the Zionist movement coincided: both called for Jewish emi-
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gration from Europe. Ergo, in his warped thinking, he was working, as an SS
bureaucrat, together with Jewish leaders, to devise “‘a mutually acceptable’” reso-
lution to a common concern. Eichmann went even further. In the late 1930s,
before the beginning of  the Final Solution, he was the SS officer in charge of
organising the expulsion of  Jews from the Nazi-dominated territories of
Europe. At his trial, he declared that, by directing that expulsion, he “ha[d] saved
hundreds of  thousands of  Jewish lives.” Arendt called this “claim” “preposter-
ous.” Nevertheless, she pointed out that, while in command of  the expulsion of
the Jews of  Austria in 1938-1939, Eichmann had, in fact, negotiated in Vienna –
in a sense, worked together with – Jewish emissaries from Palestine, who had
come to seek Jewish recruits for settlement there. Eichmann’s memory, however,
failed him. He could not remember those envoys. Conceivably, Arendt suggest-
ed, the emissaries could have supported his bizarre arguments that he had
worked in partnership with Jewish leaders on a common project, and that, if  he
had not saved, he had helped Jewish people. “There were certain Jews in Vienna
whom [Eichmann] recalled very vividly,” Arendt wrote, “… but they were not
those Palestinian emissaries, who might have backed up his story.”40
But while incriminatingly defective, Eichmann’s memory was not a total
wreck. There was a way in which it worked: it “functioned only in respect to
things that had had a direct bearing upon his career.” Eichmann, for example,
recalled visiting Slovakia in 1942, and receiving the great “honor” of  being host-
ed by its Minister of  the Interior, “who [also] invited [his guest] to bowl with
him.” But, Eichmann genuinely could not remember that he had an official SS
assignment for his trip: to discuss the deportation of  Slovakian Jews to the Nazi
concentration camps. To him, hobnobbing with Slovakia’s Minister appeared to
be an enormous “honor.” His rank in the Nazi hierarchy was not sufficiently
high for such an event to be a matter of  course: “it was unusual for him to
receive social invitations from members of  governments.” Eichmann remem-
bered consorting with the Minister because it signified an ascent in the Nazi
regime on his part – high enough to merit ministerial social invitations. His
memory retained that illustrious moment, and expunged his bureaucratic mis-
sion. It was, thus, a “career”-centred power of  his mind – a mental mechanism
that recorded information related to his Nazi “career” – in this case, his “suc-
cess” in it – and erased other data. But what his memory’s “career”-focused
operation shows is that Eichmann’s careerism had penetrated his mind and cor-
rupted it. Like a virus, it had infected his memory and debilitated it.41
Arendt’s depiction of  his memory shows that – as careerism –
Eichmann’s drive to success dominated him thoroughly. It determined the way
his mind worked. Thus, Arendt did not represent Eichmann only as being bour-
geois in his life and “work.” On her “report,” his being bourgeois controlled –
deformed – his very mind. 
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Eichmann’s being bourgeois afflicted his mind in a further way. It did
so during his interrogation before his trial. Analysing its transcript, Arendt found
in the interrogation a strange – but deeply significant – moment.42 The interro-
gation was carried out by Captain Avner Less, a German-Jewish police officer.
Arendt noticed that, in it, Eichmann “explain[ed] to [Less] at considerable
length, and repeatedly, [that] he had been unable to attain a higher grade in the
S.S., [and] that this was not his fault.” He recurrently told his interrogator that
“he had done everything” to reach a higher SS rank but had failed to do so. In
this explanation, Arendt observed, Eichmann sought understanding – “sympa-
thy” – from Less – for his failure to rise higher than he did in the SS. He was
looking for “‘normal, human’ sympathy for a hard-luck story.”43
Arendt found Eichmann’s story deeply strange. She saw as weird the
fact that he, a person charged with a crime, indeed, the historically unprecedent-
ed one of  the Holocaust, was looking for understanding, from the detective
investigating his deeds, for his failure to rise higher in the ranks of  the organisa-
tion that had committed the crime. But, for Arendt, what was especially bizarre
was that he sought understanding from the “German Jew” Less – a member of
the ethnic group that he had endeavoured to destroy. Eichmann was seeking
sympathy from an individual whom his deeds had victimised – mortally. For
Arendt, this was absurd.44
Arendt explained Eichmann’s absurdity through Eichmann’s main argu-
ment. She perceived it as a prime example of  what she claimed was the Nazi’s
defining characteristic – his “inability” “to think from the standpoint of  some-
body else.” “It was precisely this lack of  imagination,” she asserted,  
which enabled him to sit for months on end facing a German
Jew who was conducting the police interrogation, pouring out
his heart to the man and explaining again and again how it
was that he reached only the rank of  lieutenant colonel in the
S.S. and that it had not been his fault that he was not promot-
ed.
Arendt theorised that his incapacity to think from another’s perspective prevent-
ed Eichmann from seeing himself  in the way in which most people around him,
including, presumably, Less, and certainly Arendt, saw him – as an individual
charged with an unprecedented crime, who did not deserve and could not possi-
bly obtain sympathy, from one of  his intended victims, for not climbing higher than
he did in the chain of  command of  the organisation that had perpetrated the
crime. By thus barring his mental vision, the defect in his thinking permitted
Eichmann to verbalise recurrently, without compunction, his story of  failure –
thereby performing an act of  absurdity.45
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Arendt thus claimed that Eichmann’s absurd conduct during his police
interrogation was brought about by his monoperspectival thinking. But, surpris-
ingly, she showed – without herself  seeing it clearly – that there were, in fact,
two impulses that motivated Eichmann’s outpourings to Less.46
In his recurrent story to the detective, as Arendt described it, Eichmann
was hoping to “find” “sympathy.” Thus, his account was motivated, on Arendt’s
own analysis of  it, by a plain desire for sympathy.47 But, as a whole, Arendt’s
representation of  Eichmann in her book indicates that a longing for sympathy
was not the decisive motive that gave rise to his outpourings to Less. Apart from
the description of  his interrogation, the Eichmann that emerges from Eichmann
is not an individual who ever needed or desired sympathy from other people.
Arendt consistently depicts him as a self-sufficient man, who never wished for,
or sought, understanding from others. Hence, a desire for sympathy probably
played a weak role in Eichmann’s soul-baring to his interrogator.
But there was another, far more powerful, motive for that soul-baring.
It is, simply, Eichmann’s careerism. What gave rise to his absurd story was not so
much a search for sympathy; and it was not an “inability” “to think from the
standpoint of  somebody else.” It was his single-minded focus on his “career.”
Arendt’s account of  his interrogation shows that, years after the end of  the Nazi
regime, years after the entire world had condemned that rule as a criminal one,
and under investigation for his participation in its egregious crimes, Eichmann
was still concerned about his “career” success in that regime. In Arendt’s exami-
nation of  his interrogation, Eichmann, thus, emerges not as an individual inca-
pable of  seeing himself  from the perspective of  another, but as one who saw
only his “career.” His “career” appears as his sole and exclusive concern. This
overriding, zealous concern was what literally motivated his recurrent account of
disappointment in his SS “career.” It was that story’s decisive motive. Indeed,
that story, as Arendt represented it, reveals Eichmann’s careerism as a motive of
a maniacal order. It was a monomania that drove him to disregard totally his cur-
rent circumstances. It blinded his mind, and compelled him to verbalise his dis-
appointment in his “career” to his Jewish interrogator.48
Arendt fails to see that. She claims that what gave rise to Eichmann’s
absurd story was his monoperspectival thinking. But she shows, unwittingly, that
a monomaniacal careerism was the motive that forced Eichmann to perform his
act of  absurdity. She describes how the Nazi bureaucrat recounted his disap-
pointment in his SS “career;” how his story of  a “career” letdown was drastically
improper in his interrogation by a Jewish detective. And yet, she does not see
that his careerism is the chief  motive for Eichmann’s story – and hence the chief
motive for the radical incongruity – his absurdity – between his behaviour and
its context. Her perception failing in this way, Arendt deploys her conception of
his thinking to explain Eichmann’s bizarre behaviour. But, privileging that con-
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ception, this explanatory strategy obstructs her vision and prevents her from see-
ing what her own account of  Eichmann’s absurdity shows as its main motive –
his careerism. It thus leads her to perform an analytical absurdity.49
Thus, Eichmann’s depiction of  his mind too bourgeoisified Eichmann.
On it, his being bourgeois determined – deformed – the operation of  his mind.
As careerism, his drive to success controlled – and corrupted – the workings of
his memory; it also blinded him to the context of  his police interrogation –
compelling him to behave absurdly. Yet, strangely, Arendt did not perceive in his
mind the Nazi bureaucrat’s being bourgeois. This misperception appeared in and
damaged her rendition of  his interrogation. There, she observed what she
thought was an absurdity in the Nazi’s conduct. But herself  performing an
absurdity, she attributed that behaviour to his monoperspectival thinking. She did
not realise that its motive was the bureaucrat’s drive to success – which eclipsed
his mind and forced him to behave weirdly. Arendt failed to see that the source
of  Eichmann’s absurdity was his being bourgeois. 
Eichmann’s being bourgeois and Arendt’s failure to understand it ade-
quately transpired, finally, in Eichmann’s analysis of  “the banality of  evil.” In
doing so, they precluded the achievement of  the book’s central objectives –
thwarting its understanding of  Eichmann and his trial.    
The trial, as Arendt noted, was an event of  great significance. It had
important meanings – moral, political, historical, philosophical – that surpassed
it qua judicial case. It raised, for example, crucial “general questions,” such as:
how could the catastrophe of  the Holocaust happen? Arendt, however, insisted
that its extrajudicial meanings were irrelevant to the trial, and must not become a
part of  it. Its one and only legitimate goal was to render justice. “I held and hold
the opinion,” she declared, “that this trial had to take place in the interests of
justice and nothing else.” At the same time, Arendt, as we saw, understood
Eichmann’s subtitle literally – believing that it was a “report” on Eichmann’s trial.
Reflecting on the trial and on her “report,” she wrote:  
… the question of  individual guilt or innocence, the act of
meting out justice to both the defendant and the victim, are
the only things at stake in a criminal court. The Eichmann
trial was no exception … . The present report deals with
nothing but the extent to which the court in Jerusalem suc-
ceeded in fulfilling the demands of  justice.50
These were the concluding words of  the “Postscript” to Eichmann’s
1965 edition – its final, definitive one. Thus, the book’s last word was “justice.”
But, as we saw, Arendt’s “report” was highly idiosyncratic. It strayed vigorously
towards Eichmann’s mind. Indeed, by doing so, it came to resemble an examina-
tion of  a psychiatrist, aimed at diagnosing a mental patient.51 Justice and law,
however, do not concern themselves with the precise workings of  a criminal mind
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– such as the operation of  the perspectivism of  its thinking. Conversely, criminal
law – the law that deals with criminal activities like Eichmann’s – does concern
itself  with intent and with motive.
Indeed, the concepts of  “intent” and of  “motive” occupy a very
important position in criminal law. The latter assumes that criminal actions –
crimes – have a subjective dimension – consisting of  the thinking and the emo-
tions that accompany them. Criminal law terms this subjectivity “mens rea,” liter-
ally, “guilty mind,” and considers intent and motive to be central elements of
that mind. It understands intent to be the purposefulness of  criminal actions; it
sees motive as the subjective drive that inspires such actions. If, for example, a
person deliberately kills his neighbour out of  revenge because the latter has
keyed his new sports car, the murder’s purposefulness is its intent; its motive is
revenge. Criminal law, moreover, conceptualises intent as a main determinant of
the criminality of  criminal actions – of  that criminality’s character and magni-
tude. In the case of  homicide, for instance, intent – its presence or absence –
defines the crime’s nature: a purposeful homicide is categorised as “murder;” an
unintentional one as the less serious crime of  “involuntary manslaughter.” In
contrast, criminal law regards motive as much less important than intent. As a
general principle, it considers motive to be “irrelevant” to the criminality of
crimes. For example, if  a person steals her neighbour’s new sports car, the law
judges her action to be a theft, regardless of  her motive – whether it be hatred
of  her neighbour, or the desire to save her ill husband’s life by driving him to a
hospital with the car. Nevertheless, criminal law takes motive into consideration
in determining the character and the magnitude of  the criminality of  crimes –
thereby allowing motive to play a role in itself. It will, thus, take the car thief ’s
motive into account when assessing the criminality of  her actions. If  she is moti-
vated by the noble impulse to save her partner’s life, it may impose on her a
lenient sentence. Thus, the concepts of  intent and of  motive assume a central
role in criminal law – it employs them as key conceptual tools in assessing the
criminality of  criminal actions.52
Arendt was well aware of  the centrality of  intent in criminal law.
Discussing the success of  Eichmann’s trial in rendering justice, she writes: 
Foremost among the … issues at stake in the … trial was the
assumption current in all modern legal systems that intent to
do wrong is necessary for the commission of  a crime. On
nothing, perhaps, has civilized jurisprudence prided itself
more than on this taking into account of  the subjective factor.
Arendt, moreover, thought that motive is also linked closely to criminal actions.
In her view, as we saw, a crucial aspect of  what she called “the banality of  evil”
was the fact that, in his activities as a main perpetrator of  the Holocaust,
Eichmann was not driven by evil motives. For Arendt, this vacuity of  motive was
one of  his most shocking traits. In other words: she expected to find in the Nazi
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a motive for his perpetration of  genocide; she supposed that, like intent, motive
too is a source of  crime. Arendt thus assumed, like criminal law, that motive and
intent constitute important criteria – critical conceptual instruments – for assess-
ing the criminality of  crimes.53
Arendt believed firmly that justice was what the Eichmann trial was all
about. But, by moving towards a dissection of  its subject’s mind, Eichmann
strayed away from – overlooking – law and justice. Explaining the meaning of
the phenomenon of  “the banality of  evil,” Arendt makes an observation of  cru-
cial significance for her “report.” Having stressed that Eichmann did not have
evil motives for his crimes, she states: “Except for an extraordinary diligence in look-
ing out for his personal advancement, he had no motives at all [italics mine].”54 This
statement is momentous. It claims, without Arendt’s realising its moment, that
Eichmann’s only motive – the one and only motive that he ever had, in
Jerusalem, and throughout his life – was his careerism – his drive to success.
Precisely that bourgeois drive – his being bourgeois – could well be a criminal
motive that transformed him into a chief  perpetrator of  the Holocaust. Arendt
does not see that. And her failure of  understanding is perplexing. She does not
question the innocence of  Eichmann’s careerism. She claims that her book tries
to assess the realisation of  justice in Jerusalem. But she fails to realise that, if  his
drive to success was, as she states, the main motive of  Eichmann’s life, law and
justice – and her own assumptions on the role of  intent and of  motive in them
– demand a reflection on the implication, in his crimes, of  Eichmann’s being
bourgeois.
Concluding Reflections: Being Bourgeois, Nazism and Capitalism
Eichmann bourgeoisified Eichmann. Surreptitiously and unintentionally, it repre-
sented him as being bourgeois. This essay brings out this representation.
Scattered throughout Arendt’s book, it constitutes an inadvertent subtext that
contends with the book’s main ostensible argument.  
Contra that argument, Eichmann’s unwitting subtext does not depict
Eichmann as a bureaucrat with a mental defect that led him to become a chief
executor of  the Holocaust. It represents him, rather, as a dedicated bureaucrat
completing a genocidal job assignment – motivated, in doing so, by a bourgeois
drive to success. Eichmann’s subtextual narrative shows that Eichmann’s defining
characteristic was not a monoperspectival thinking, but being bourgeois.
Moreover, it indicates that his being bourgeois transformed Eichmann into a
principal executor of  the Holocaust. His being bourgeois converted him into a
follower of  Hitler, and compelled him to enter the SS; in Vienna, it probably
motivated his “work” as an organiser of  the expulsion of  Austria’s Jews; in
Hungary, it forced him to devote himself  single-mindedly to his murderous
duties, and, opposing the orders of  Himmler, to carry the Holocaust on. Even
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more, Eichmann’s sole motive, ever, was, in the form of  careerism, his bourgeois
drive to success – again, his being bourgeois. And this being bourgeois may well
be the motive for Eichmann’s crimes. By describing the Nazi in these ways,
Eichmann’s surreptitious and inadvertent subtext challenges the book’s main argu-
ment that Eichmann’s foremost feature was a monoperspectival mind that turned
him into a chief  perpetrator of  the Holocaust. It proposes, instead, that
Eichmann’s primary trait was being bourgeois – which transformed him into that
egregious criminal.55
But while bourgeoisifying Eichmann, Arendt failed to understand ade-
quately his being bourgeois, and to see it as criminal. Instead, she concentrated
on the defective operation of  his mind, and thought that his crimes were its
issue. Arendt’s idiosyncratic focus on Eichmann’s mind had a special source. In
the introduction to her last work, The Life of  the Mind, she recalled that that trea-
tise originated in Jerusalem. “The immediate impulse” that gave birth to it, she
noted, “came from [her] attending the Eichmann trial.” There, her “interest” was
“awakened” by what she saw as Eichmann’s most striking feature – his “thought-
lessness” – the blatant “absence of  thinking” that, in Eichmann, she conceptu-
alised as the Nazi bureaucrat’s incapacity to think from the perspective of  anoth-
er human being. Struck by Eichmann’s mental defect, Arendt asked herself: 
Could the activity of  thinking as such, the habit of  examining
whatever happens to come to pass or to attract attention,
regardless of  results and specific content, could this activity be
among the conditions that make men abstain from evil-doing
or even actually “condition” them against it? 
This question, Arendt explained, “first” inspired in her a “preoccupation with
mental activities.” The eventual product of  that fascination would be The Life of
the Mind.56 Thus, Eichmann’s trial occasioned, for Arendt, a novel intellectual
interest in the human mind. Discovered in Jerusalem, that interest thenceforth
became a central concern in her work. Indeed, it came to dominate that work in
the last years of  her life – ultimately coming to fruition in Life. But, as this essay
indicates, Eichmann shows that this newfound interest became excessively intense
in Arendt’s reportage of  the Eichmann trial. In Eichmann, it drove her to focus
too single-mindedly on Eichmann’s mind – and to neglect “the demands of  jus-
tice.”57
Eichmann’s idiosyncratic focus and its source are filled with meaning.
Discovered in Jerusalem, as we just saw, Arendt’s philosophical interest in “the
life of  the mind” was what skewed her book towards Eichmann’s mind, and
away from his being bourgeois, becoming a barrier to an adequate understanding
of  the latter. In other words, what distorted Eichmann was a new professional
interest on Arendt’s part in the human mind – a new objective in her intellectual
career. What warped her book was, in this sense, careerism. Careerism is, thus,
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the origin of  Eichmann’s strange focus, and a source of  its surprising disregard of
Eichmann’s being bourgeois. In showing it, Arendt appears, in a profound irony,
similar to the object of  her reportage. Like Eichmann, she too emerges as
intensely concentrated on her new career objective – as single-mindedly focused
on her career. She too becomes dominated by careerism. And, as in Eichmann’s
case, careerism has tragic consequences for her as well – it seriously damages her
Eichmann.58
Through its cunning subtext, Eichmann also exhibits a momentous his-
toriographical meaning. Its unintended subtextual narrative connects the history
of  Nazism to that of  the system of  socio-economic organisation that historians
call “capitalism.” As this essay has argued, Arendt shows in her book that, as
embodied in Eichmann, being bourgeois was implicated in the Holocaust. Thus,
Eichmann implies that Max Horkheimer may be right, after all, when he suggest-
ed that understanding the history of  Nazism demands relating it to that of  capi-
talism. Inadvertently, Arendt suggests, with Horkheimer, that Nazism was a child
of  capitalism.
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careerism in one’s work does not automatically make one a Nazi. Here, I argue
that, like Eichmann, Arendt exhibited careerism. And that her careerism – her
intellectual absorption in the “life of  the mind” – thwarted her attempt to
understand Eichmann’s trial judiciously.
Evil in the Subtext: Reading Eichmann in Jerusalem 85
LH 18_1 Final_Left History 18.1.qxd  2014-07-10  9:20 AM  Page 85
LH 18_1 Final_Left History 18.1.qxd  2014-07-10  9:20 AM  Page 86
